THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF SENDING THE HUNGARIAN 2ND ARMY TO THE FRONT

Abstract

By December 1941, the Hungarian troops participating in fights against the Soviet Union got home. There were only occupation forces staying on the occupied territories. However, the German leadership required bigger efforts from its allies. In order to make up the considerable German losses and take over the Soviet raw material sources, Hitler needed to involve the Italian, Romanian, Hungarian military forces to a greater extent. In order to use further armed forces, the Romanian leadership imposed the condition that Hungary should also send troops to the Eastern front so that it could not preserve its military force untouched. The German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop visiting Hungary, then the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, field marshal Wilhelm Keitel required that two third of the Hungarian Army should be sent to the front. In exchange for it, they promised to deliver modern weapons, while they threatened Hungary with serious retorsions if the Hungarians withdrew themselves from the common fights. The political leadership of Hungary was in a difficult situation. The Hungarian government did not dare to reject this request. However, they did not want to send the whole Hungarian armed force to the front. The Prime Minister, László Bárdossy and the Chief of the General Staff, general Ferenc Szombathelyi could only achieve the decrease of the quantity of the forces ordered to the front through unusually harsh debates. The unplanned action on the front entailed grievous political consequences and tragic losses.