

PROBLEMS OF THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL  
MINORITY IN POLAND IN THE YEARS 1919-1923

When Central-Eastern Europe started to emerge in its new shape from the war turmoil of 1914-1918, the problem of national minorities, which as a result of the political solutions adopted in the years 1918-1923, found themselves within the borders of the states newly created in this territory, became one of the main problems both of the home and foreign policy of this region.

The problem of the Ukrainian population inhabiting the territories which at the end of the period under discussion became an integral part of the Polish State, was of particular importance in this context. It was due to several factors. The Ukrainians living in Poland were not only the most numerous national minority in the Polish Republic but also the numerically strongest one in whole Europe.<sup>1</sup> They found themselves within the borders of the Polish State against their will, however, unlike the majority of other national minorities in this region, they had no national State with which they could

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<sup>1</sup> The strongest, in many respects, minority in Europe, the German (over 6 million) was the most numerous in Czechoslovakia (about 3.5 million); however, it did not exceed the number of the Ukrainians in Poland, see: A. Czubiński, *Polityka mniejszościowa Niemiec w latach 1918-1945* (Germany's Minority Policy in the Years 1918-1945) in „*Rola mniejszości niemieckiej w rozwoju stosunków politycznych w Europie 1918-1945*” („The Role of the German Minority in the Development of the Political Relations in Europe 1918-1945”) ed. A. Czubiński, Poznań 1984, p. 16. The population of Eastern Galicia according to the Ukrainians who based their data on a census from 1910 amounted to 5.2 million in this partition: Ukrainians - 3.85 million (74%), Poles - 630,000 (12%), Jews - 640,000 (12%), Germans - 65,000 (1%) - S. Dnistrianskyi, *L'Ukraine et la Conference de la Paix, Les Questions Ukrainiennes* No 5. place of publication not given 1919, p. 97. According to an Austrian census from 1910 in Galicia there were 3,132,233 (58.9%) Ukrainians, 2,114,792 (39.7%) Poles, Jews(?). According to a Polish census from 1921 there were 2,610,082 (53.7%) Ukrainians, 1,903,480 (39.1%) Poles, 322,275 (6.6%) Jews. Apart from Eastern Galicia the Ukrainians also inhabited the following territories belonging to the Second Polish Republic: Volhynia (68.4%), Southern Polesie and to a small extent the region of Chełm. It should also be added that in the territories which had belonged to Russia before 1914, especially in Polesie, certain part of the population had no developed national consciousness and labelled themselves as „natives”. According to the Polish census from 1921 the total of the Ukrainians inhabiting Poland amounted to 3,898,431 which constituted 14% of the state's population, see: M. Papierzysńska-Turek, *Sprawa Ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922-1926* (The Ukrainian Problem in the Second Polish Republic 1922-1926), Krakow 1979, pp. 19-24. On the reliability and circumstances of the Polish census from 1921 see: J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczypospolita wielu narodów* (The Republic of Many Nations), Warszawa 1985, pp. 25-27, 76; on the demographic structure of the West-Ukrainian territories see also: *Ibid.*, pp. 76-80. Cf. also J. Tomaszewski, *Ojczyzna nie tylko Polaków. Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce*. (Homeland not only of Poles. National minorities in Poland), Warszawa 1985, pp. 31-57.

identify themselves as the Ukrainian SSR was not considered such a State by the Ukrainian political parties active in Poland. The communists were an exception but they exerted little influence on Western Ukraine.

The eastern regions of the second Polish Republic to which the Ukrainians made claims were characterized by a mixed population structure with island of Poles within the Ukrainian national territory and vice versa. Such a state made it impossible to mark an ethnic frontier between the Polish territory and the Ukrainian one and the high percentage of the Jewish population caused that in certain areas none of the main ethnic groups was in an absolute majority.

This situation was the background of a sharp Polish-Ukrainian conflict concerning mainly Eastern Galicia – a territory which before the First World War had been a part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and was inhabited by the Ukrainian majority with a strong and in some regions – even overwhelming Polish minority which dominated the Ukrainians culturally and economically. At the same time, the Ukrainian population of this territory, accustomed to the constitutional system of the Habsburg Monarchy surpassed their compatriots from the territories of the former Russian Empire in the level of national consciousness and political culture which together with the fact that the Ukrainians from Eastern Galicia were less susceptible to the slogans of the social revolution<sup>2</sup> than the Ukrainians inhabiting the Dnieper territory, predestined Eastern Galicia to the role of a centre of the Ukrainian national movement and by the same token made the conflict with Poland especially fierce.

The years 1919–1923 were of special importance for the Ukrainian population. It was during this period that the Ukrainian problem underwent considerable change in the arena of international politics – evolving from a problem connected with the existence of an independent State or rather two Ukrainian States: the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West-Ukrainian People's Republic confederated with each

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<sup>2</sup> The Ukrainian delegation in Paris tried to take advantage of the constitutional traditions of the Galician Ukrainians connected with the Austro-Hungarian heritage stressing their significance for rejecting communist ideas – see: P. Mantoux, *Les délibérations du Conseil des Quatre (24 mars–28 juin 1919)*. Notes de l'Officier Interprète depuis la remise à la Délégation Allemande des conditions de paix jusqu'à la signature du Traite de Versailles, Vol. II, pp. 146–150, Cf. – *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference 1919*, (hereafter PPC) Vol. V, Washington 1946, pp. 776–778, and: *Ibid.*, Vol VI, Washington 1943, pp. 57–59.

other<sup>3</sup> to problems concerning rights of the Ukrainian minority in other national States, first of all in Poland.<sup>4</sup>

This article – for reasons of space – is only to highlight the main problems which the Ukrainian politicians from the independence camp, as well as the Polish diplomacy directly interested in the way of solving the problem of the Ukrainian statehood, were facing at that time. I have devoted more attention to the international aspect of the Ukrainian problem in this period than to Poland's domestic policy as at that time the problem of the Ukrainian minority fell within the domain of the Polish foreign policy not its domestic policy, which was due to the fact that Polish Eastern borders were still *in statu nascendi*.

The starting point of this work is the year 1919 when the problem of the Ukrainian statehood became the subject of the debates of the Peace Conference in Paris which formally and legally decided about the new European order. The closing date of

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<sup>3</sup> For more information about the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West-Ukrainian People's Republic and the relations between these States see: N. Andrusiak, *The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia (II) – IV. The Ukrainians of Galicia During the Great War (1914–1918)*, „The Slavonic and East European Review”, Vol. XIV. – January 1936, No 41. T. Dąbkowski, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji Wschodniej 1912–1923 (The Ukrainian National Movement in Eastern Galicia 1912–1923)*, Warszawa 1985, A. Deruga, *Początek rokowań o sojusz między Piłsudskim a Petlurą (styczeń–lipiec 1919) (The Beginning of the negotiations for an Alliance Between Piłsudski and Petlura (January–July 1919))*, „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały” („On The History of the Polish-Soviet Relations. Studies and Materials”), Vol. VI, 1970, p. 48. J. Gruchała, *Austro-Węgry a sprawa ukraińska w latach I wojny światowej (Austro-Hungary and the Ukrainian Problem During the First World War)*, „Studia Historyczne (Historical Studies)”, Vol. XXVIII, 1985, No 4. (111). J. Gruchała, *Sprawa ukraińska w Galicji w polityce Austro-Węgier 1914–1918 (The Ukrainian Problem in Galicia in Austro-Hungarian Politics 1914–1918)*, „Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej” („Studies on the History of the USSR and Central Europe”), Vol. XX, 1984. L. Hass, *W trójkącie Ukraina – Watykan – Polska w latach 1919–1920. Polityka międzynarodowa w optyce ukraińskiego burżuazyjnego polityka rusofilskiego (In the Ukraine – Vatican – Poland Triangle in the Years 1919–1920. International Politics as seen by a Ukrainian Bourgeois Russophil Politician)*, „Dzieje najnowsze” („The Recent History”), Vol. XII, 1980, No 1. K. Lewandowski, *Międzynarodowe uwarunkowania powstania państwowości ukraińskiej w 1917 r. (International Conditions of the Creation of the Ukrainian Statehood in 1917)*, „Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej”, Vol. XVI, 1980. N.N., *Berestejskyj myr, „Dilo” 1928, 31 (11.285), piątnyca 10 lutoho, p. 1. J. Radziejowski, Ruch narodowy i rewolucyjny na Ukrainia w okresie działalności Centralnej Rady (marzec 1917–kwiecień 1918) (The National and Revolutionary Movement in Ukraine During the Activity of the Central Council (March 1917–April 1918))*, „Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej”, Vol. IX, 1973. N.W. Samyjłowycz, *Miesiąc welykych rokowny, „Dilo” 1932, 21 (12.970) subota 30 sicznia p. 1.*

<sup>4</sup> Finally in 1923 the territories inhabited by the Ukrainians found themselves within the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. On more information on this subject see: R. Torzecki, *Kwestia Ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933–1945 (The Ukrainian Problem in the Third Reich's Politics in the Years 1933–1945)*, Warszawa 1972, p. 31.

my considerations is marked by the recognition of the Eastern frontier of the Polish Republic by the Council of Ambassadors (14/15 March, 1923) when the problem of the Ukrainian statehood finally stopped being the subject of international politics changing into a *sensu stricto* problem of the Ukrainian minority in Poland.

The Ukrainian problem became the subject of international politics as a result of the Brześć treaties (9 February and 3 March 1918) and the creation of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic in Eastern Galicia at the turn of October and November. From 1 November 1918 the West-Ukrainian People's Republic was in state of war with Poland. The Ukrainian population from the territories of the former Russian Empire, which later became part of Poland, was rather an object not subject of the Polish-Ukrainian relations being, in this case, the result of the relations between Poland and the Ukrainian People's Republic. The Ukrainian population of Eastern Galicia was, on the other hand, the subject of fight with Poland both on the battlefield and in the international forum, and its aim was to create an independent Ukrainian State in the disputed territory. The federation of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic linked these two problems with each other, which – because of the fact that the two Ukrainian States had different political priorities – contributed to further complication of these problems.

During the Peace Conference in Paris Ukrainian interests were defended by a joint delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West-Ukrainian People's Republic presided by Hryhor Sydorenko and Vasyl Panejko.<sup>5</sup> However, as neither Ukrainian States won the recognition of the Conference, this delegation had only the status of a representation of a State which was just being created and this factor made the delegation's activity even more difficult.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the political image of the Ukraine was tarnished by the German help in the birth of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the favourable attitude of the Austrian administration to the West-Ukrai-

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<sup>5</sup> On the strength of the resolution of the Directorate of the Ukrainian People's Republic from 10 January, 1919 a group of about 60 persons went to Paris. These people were to be an official representation of the two Ukrainian Republics (the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West-Ukrainian People's Republic) which became united on 22 January, 1919. However, most of them, especially those who had taken part in negotiations connected with signing the Brześć Treaty, were refused visas by the French authorities. Finally, the Ukraine was represented by 18 persons, cf: J. Batowski, *Linia Curzona a była Galicja Wechodnia* (Curzon Line and the former Eastern Galicia), „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materialy”, Vol. III, 1968, p. 171. T. Dąbkowski, op. cit., p. 120. L. Hass, op. cit., p. 16. K. Lewandowski, *Sprawa ukraińska w polityce zagranicznej Czechosłowacji w latach 1918–1932* (The Ukrainian Problem in the Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in the Years 1918–1932), Wrocław 1974, p. 88. M. Rudnyckij, *Ukraina na Myrowij Konferenciji*, (a review of the work by Ilko Borszczak, „L'Ukraine à la Conference de la Paix (1919–1923), Paris 1938), p. 188. („Dilo” 1938, 100 [14.932]), sereda 11 trawnia, p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> PPC, Vol. III, Washington 1943, pp. 172–173.

nian People's Republic which was being created at that time, as well as by the suspicions of bolshevism. The image of the Ukrainians as Bolshevik allies of Germany<sup>7</sup> was maintained in the Western statesmen's opinion by the Polish diplomacy which laid emphasis on the German-Ukrainian cooperation,<sup>8</sup> and on the fact that ex-officers of the k.u.k. Austrian Army served in HA (Hałycka Army)<sup>9</sup>, on the fact that now and then the Ukrainian divisions were joining the Bolsheviks and again were returning to the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic or West-Ukrainian People's Republic<sup>10</sup> as well as on the contacts of the latter with the Hungarian Soviet Republic (purchase of arms).<sup>11</sup>

Representatives of the victorious Allied and Associated Powers debating in Paris examined the Ukrainian problem from the point of view of antibolshevism, perceiving the Ukrainians as a force able to prevent the progress of the Red Army. In this context the Polish-Ukrainian war in Eastern Galicia which involved forces of the two sides thus making it impossible to use them on the anti-Soviet front, was „some quarrel at Lemberg”<sup>12</sup>. Hence, the Peace Conference undertook numerous attempts at mediation concerning the Polish-Ukrainian relations. During the first half of 1919 they were sabotaged by that side which at a given time had an advantage on the front and aimed at a *manu militari* solution. At first it was the Ukrainian side, and from March – the Polish one.

It is worth noting that the problem connected with the existence of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic in Eastern Galicia dominated in the work of the Paris Conference pushing the matter of the Ukrainian People's Republic to the background. It was justified by the fact that the Conference did not feel entitled to solve the problem of the national status of territories of former Russia – the ex-ally of the Entente Powers. Its rebirth and „setting its matters in order” were still counted on and it was expected that Russia would resume its role of the main anti-German force in the East which was especially significant for France. Hence, the debates in Paris were of no

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<sup>7</sup> PPC, Vol. III. p.776. Sprawy polskie na Konferencji Pokojowej w Paryżu w 1919 r. Dokumenty i materiały (hereafter SPKP) (Polish Problems at the Paris Peace Conference in in 1919. Documents and Materials), ed. R. Bierzanek and J. Kukulka, Vol. I, Warszawa 1965, p. 43.

<sup>8</sup> PPC, Vol. III, pp. 980–982, 988.

<sup>9</sup> T. Dąbkowski, op. cit., p. 125.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 142–149, 166.

<sup>11</sup> Z. Zaks, Walka dyplomatyczna o naftę wschodniogalicyską 1918–1923, (Diplomatic Fight for the East-Galician Oil 1918–1923), „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i Materiały”, Vol. IV, 1969, pp. 44–45.

<sup>12</sup> PPC, Vol. IV, pp. 379–385 – Such an opinion about the Polish-Ukrainian struggles was expressed by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Lloyd George, at the meeting of the Supreme War Council of the Allied and Associated Powers on 17 March, 1919.

importance for the population of Volhynia and Polesie. As far as these territories and Eastern Galicia were concerned, Poland's serious rival was „white” Russia, which was at war with the Ukrainian People's Republic and which did not recognize the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation. Its representatives demanded that the Peace Conference should recognize not only Russia's integrity within its borders of 1914, reluctantly approving of the creation of the „Vistula Province” but also laid claims to all the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited, as they maintained, by „Russians”<sup>13</sup>. These attempts met strong objection of the Ukrainian People's Republic, but the attitude of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic evolved towards a federation with „white” Russia as the Ukrainians suffered defeats on all fronts.

The defeats of the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the fact that the Red Army was approaching the frontiers of Eastern Galicia made the Great Powers come to the conviction that the Ukrainians were not a sufficient anti-Bolshevik force. A possible Soviet invasion of Eastern Galicia, as it was a way to connect Moscow with the Hungarian Soviet Republic, seemed to be a serious threat to European peace in Paris. In this situation „to satisfy the immediate military necessity of resisting the Bolshevik invasion of Galicia”<sup>14</sup> it was decided on 25 June 1919 that Poland would be allowed to occupy Eastern Galicia by force of arms, the future political status of Eastern Galicia, however, was not formally settled.<sup>15</sup> As a result of this decision whole Eastern Galicia found itself under the control of the Polish Army until 17 July, which pushed HA outside the Zbrutch River (Zbrucz). The West-Ukrainian People's Republic having lost all its territory actually ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian problem had its short renaissance in Paris. It was connected with a victorious offensive of the allied army forces of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West-Ukrainian People's Republic against the Bolsheviks. However, as soon as Kiev was captured, fights between the Ukrainian and Denikin's army broke out as a result of which the former lost the sympathy of the Entente which unquestioningly supported „white” Russia in this quarrel.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> For more information see: A. Juzwenko, *Polska a „biała” Rosja (od listopada 1918 do kwietnia 1920 r.)* (Poland and „white” Russia (from November 1918 until April 1920)), Wrocław 1973, p. 88.

<sup>14</sup> PPC, Vol. VI, Washington 1946, p. 687.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 677.

<sup>16</sup> PPC, Vol. XI, Washington 1945, p. 662. Cf. T. Dąbkowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 118, 141–142. A. Juzwenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–141, 200. Z. Zals, *Galicja w polityce Zachodnio-Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej i Ukraińskiej Republiki Ludowej w drugiej połowie 1919 r.* (Galicia in the politics of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic in the second half of 1919) (in:) *Narod i państwo. Prace ofiarowane Henrykowi Jabłońskiemu w 60 rocznicę urodzin* (Nation and State. Works dedicated to Henryk Jabłoński for the 60th anniversary of his birthday), ed. by T. Cieślak, Warszawa 1969, pp. 391, 395.

Denikin's successes also undermined Poland's diplomatic position as far as its claims to Eastern Galicia were concerned. This was reflected in the unfavourable for Poland decision of the Peace Conference from 21 November, announced on 8 December 1919, which did not recognize Eastern Galicia as an integral part of the Polish State but regarded it as a mandate territory of the League of Nations which was to come under Poland's control for 25 years and after this period the future of this province was to be determined by the Council of the League of Nations.<sup>17</sup> The break-down of Denikin's offensive ruined the chances for „white” Russia's victory and in this way strengthened Poland's position in this matter. As a result of this on 22 December the execution of the decision of 21 November was suspended.<sup>18</sup> It was the last decision of the Peace Conference as far as the Ukrainian problem was concerned. It left the problem of the future of Eastern Galicia in a provisional state.

In the year of 1920 Poland's alliance with the Ukrainian People's Republic and the Polish-Soviet war hindered the anti-Polish action of the diplomacy of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic.<sup>19</sup> Soon, however, the Treaty of Riga deciding about the division of the Ukrainian territory between Poland and Soviet Russia practically liquidated the Ukrainian People's Republic and showed the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Eastern Galicia in a new light. The chances of „white” Russia's victory or creation of a Ukrainian State on the Dnieper, independent of Moscow, disappeared. This fact accelerated the evolution of the Ukrainian issue on the territory incorporated into the Polish Republic towards the minority problem. Nevertheless, the émigré government of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic still endeavoured to defend the conception of the Ukrainian statehood in Eastern Galicia. It was visible in the attempts at raising this problem on the forum of the League of Nations. The Ukrainian émigré government hoped, at the same time, to gain support of the Western Powers and of Czechoslovakia which being in conflict with Poland in connection with the Teschen Silesia from the very start supported the West-Ukrainian People's Republic materially (weapons, ammunition, military equipment) and morally and attempting to have a frontier with Russia it made even plans for the Czechoslovak-West-Ukrainian federation.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Archiwum polityczne Ignacego Padrewskiego (hereafter APIP) (Political Archives of Ignacy Paderewski), ed. W. Stankiewicz and A. Piber Vol. II. (1919–1921), Wrocław 1974, p. 379. Cf. PPC, Vol. IX, Washington 1946, pp. 285–286.

<sup>18</sup> APIP, Vol II, p. 398. PPC, Vol. IX, p. 626. SPKP, Vol. II, p. 376.

<sup>19</sup> K. Lewandowski, *Sprawa ukraińska ...*, p. 163.

<sup>20</sup> The problem of the Polish-Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations is presented most thoroughly in the quoted above work by K. Lewandowski, *Sprawa ukraińska w polityce zagranicznej Czechosłowacji w latach 1918–1932* (The Ukrainian Problem in the Czechoslovak Foreign Policy in the Years 1918–1932), Wrocław, 1974 and in an article by the same author, *W kręgu problematyki stosunków czechosłowacko-ukraińsko-pols-*

The Ukrainians expecting a solution favourable for them undertook action in the arena of international politics which aimed at making the Western Powers finally determine the status of Eastern Galicia thus ending the provisional state created in December 1919. The Ukrainians were supported by the numerous émigrés and the states being in conflict with Poland such as the already mentioned Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Soviet Russia.<sup>21</sup> The government of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic,<sup>22</sup> deprived of its territory, not recognized by other states and facing an accomplished fact i.e. the Treaty of Riga,<sup>23</sup> concentrated on the fight for the execution of the principle of the powers' sovereignty contained in Article 91 of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye according to which Austria renounced its rights to the whole Galicia (including Eastern Galicia) for the benefit of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers.<sup>24</sup> It should be noted, however, that the powers were not physically able to establish sovereign rule on Eastern Galicia as no Polish government could consent to letting the Polish Army leave this province because in such a case it would have stopped being the government at once. Hence, the powers' sovereignty was only theoretical as far as Eastern Galicia was concerned.

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kich 1918–1922, (On the Problems Concerning the Czechoslovak-Ukrainian-Polish Relations 1918–1922), „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i Materiały”, Vol. VI, 1970, pp. 183–195. See also: Z. Sládek, J. Valenta, Sprawy ukraińskie w czechosłowackiej polityce wschodniej w latach 1918–1922, (Ukrainian Matters in the Czechoslovak Eastern Policy in the Years 1918–1922), „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały”, Vol. III, 1968, pp. 137–169.

<sup>21</sup> For more information see: Z. Zaks, *Galicja Wschodnia w polskiej polityce zagranicznej (1921–1923)* (Eastern Galicia in the Polish Foreign Policy (1921–1923)), „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały”, Vol. VIII, 1971, pp. 3–36. Z. Zaks, *Radziecka Rosja i Ukraine wobec sprawy państwowej przynależności Galicji Wschodniej 1920–1923* (Soviet Russia and the Ukraine and the Problem of the National Status of Eastern Galicia 1920–1923), „Z dziejów stosunków polsko-radzieckich. Studia i materiały”, Vol. VI, 1970, pp. 69–94. Z. Zaks, *Sprawa Galicji Wschodniej Lidze Narodów (1920–1922)* (The Problem of Eastern Galicia in the League of Nations (1920–1922)) „Najnowsze Dzieje Polski. Materiały i Studia z Okresu 1914–1939” („The Recent History of Poland. Materials and Studies from the Years 1914–1939”), Vo. XII, 1967, pp. 127–153.

<sup>22</sup> At the end of 1919 there was a split in the delegation of the Ukraine in Paris and since then the diplomacy of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic acted separately – on more information see: T. Dąbkowski, *op.cit.*, pp. 178–179. A. Juzwenko, *op.cit.*, pp. 209. L. Hass, *op.cit.*, pp. 18–19, Z. Zaks, *Problem Galicji Wschodniej w czasie wojny polsko-radzieckiej* (The Problem of Eastern Galicia during the Polish-Soviet War), „Studia z dziejów ZSRR i Europy Środkowej”, Vol. VIII, 1972, pp. 82–83. Z. Zaks, *Galicja Wschodnia w polityce ...*, p. 390.

<sup>23</sup> On the attitude of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic to the Treaty of Riga see T. Dąbkowski, *op.cit.*, p. 181 and Z. Zaks, *Radziecka Rosja ...*, p. 81.

<sup>24</sup> *Traite de paix entre les puissances allies et associees et l'Autriche. Protocole et declarations signes a Saint-Germain-en-Laye le 10 Septembre 1919, Paris 1919*, pp. 39–40.

Any attempts to link Eastern Galicia more closely with Poland – in accordance with the already mentioned tactics of the diplomacy of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic – evoked vigorous Ukrainian protests. Occasions for making protests were such events as the enlistment of men from Galicia for the Polish Army, holding election to the Polish Parliament and the introduction of a division into provinces (voivodeships) which made the administrative system of Eastern Galicia similar to that of the rest of Poland.<sup>25</sup> However, the attitudes of the Ukrainian parties from the territories which had belonged to Russia before 1914 and on the strength of the Treaty of Riga had been incorporated into Poland did not support the boycott of the elections to the Sejm and Senate, which was announced by the Ukrainian parties in Eastern Galicia, and managed to create Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation which was loyal to the Polish State but did not renounce the thought of independent Ukraine.<sup>26</sup>

Simultaneously with the Ukrainian campaign the Polish authorities undertook actions aiming, on the one hand, at an integration of the whole state territory of the Polish Republic including Eastern Galicia, and, on the other hand, at demonstrating to the Great Powers and the foreign public that Poland itself could secure autonomous rights of the Ukrainian population living within its borders which was reflected by the „Statute relative to the principles of common self-government in provinces and especially in Lvov, Tarnopol and Stanilavov provinces”<sup>27</sup> of 26 September 1922.

At the same time, as the stability of the Polish statehood in Eastern Galicia was gradually achieved, the problems raised by the Ukrainians more and more clearly were assuming the character of a fight of the Ukrainian minority in Poland for their rights. Such was the character of the dispute concerning the creation of a Ukrainian University in Lvov as well as of the problem of the Ukrainian education on lower levels, the problem of autocephalia and the Ukrainisation of the Orthodox Church in Poland which so far had been dominated by the Great Russians continuing the tradition of „one indivisible Russia” and of the problem of the Polish military colonisation in the territories inhabited by the Ukrainian populations.<sup>28</sup> Although Poland on the strength

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<sup>25</sup> On more information See: M. Papierzyńska-Turek, op.cit., pp. 56, 117, 121–126, 135–140, 154–157. Cf. J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita* ..., p. 82.

<sup>26</sup> A group of 5 Ukrainian deputies „Chliborobi”, which had no wider social support, remained outside the Ukrainian Parliamentary Representation. See: M. Papierzyńska-Turek, op. cit., pp. 140–157. Wrong information on this subject is given by J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita* ..., p. 82.

<sup>27</sup> *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Journal of Law of the Polish Republic)* from 25 October, No 90, item 829, Year 1922, Warszawa 1922, pp. 1553–1555.

<sup>28</sup> M. Papierzyńska-Turek, op. cit., pp. 29–31, 42–43, 86–113, 20, 164–168, 170–172. Cf.: A. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939 (Concepts of the Nationalist Policy of the Polish Governments in the Years 1921–1939)*, Wrocław 1979, p. 30, 45–48, 50–54, 57–67. J. Tomaszewski, *Ojczyzna* ..., pp. 64–70, J. Tomaszewski, *Rzeczpospolita* ..., pp. 88–95.

of the resolutions of the so called Little Treaty of Versailles undertook obligations in relation to its national minorities adhering to which was to be supervised by the League of Nations,<sup>29</sup> the legal situation of the Ukrainian in Eastern Galicia as far as this matter was concerned was at the time under discussion unclear because of the lack of international recognition of Poland's sovereignty over this province. The Galician Ukrainian, always stressing that their country was only under a temporary Polish occupation, did not – of course – aim at solving the problem of the national status of Eastern Galicia in a way favourable for Poland. Such an attitude, however, made it impossible for them, to appear in the League of Nations as a national minority demanding its due treaty protection.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, the Polish government, being the real master of the situation, wanted to avoid frictions in its relations with the Great Powers on whose decision until the second half of 1921 the Polish frontiers with Germany were to a great extent dependent.<sup>31</sup> Being satisfied with effective ruling over Eastern Galicia it employed the tactics of postponing the solution of this problem until a moment favourable for Poland.

Such a moment came at the beginning of 1923 when the case of Klajpeda (Memel) and the occupation of the Ruhra Basin made it possible for the Polish diplomacy to present the problem of Eastern Galicia in the context of the above mentioned threats to European peace constituted by the unsettled territorial and political matters. As there were no other serious claimants to the territory of Eastern Galicia the Council of Ambassadors decided to assign it to Poland on 14/15 March, 1923.<sup>32</sup>

This fact formally ended the Ukrainian diplomatic fight to win international recognition and support for the states created by them. The Ukrainian People's Republic practically left the European political scene when the Treaty of Riga was

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<sup>29</sup> For more information about the international system of protecting national minorities see: W. Michowitz, *Polska wobec traktatu i procedury mniejszosciowej w latach 1920–1934* (Poland in Relation to the Minority Treaty and Procedures in the Years 1920–1934), *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne* (Scientific Publications of the Łódź University. Humanist-Social Sciences), S. I. No 15, Łódź 1960, pp. 189–226.

<sup>30</sup> Z. Zaks, *Sprawa Galicji Wschodniej ...*, pp. 145–146.

<sup>31</sup> SPKP, Vol. II. p. 333. Cf.: APIP, Vol. II, pp. 382–383.

<sup>32</sup> K. W. Kumaniecki, *Odbudowa państwowości polskiej. Najważniejsze dokumenty 1912–styczeń 1924* (Restoration of Polish Statehood. The Most Important Documents 1912–January 1924), Warszawa–Kraków 1924, pp. 679–680. For more information about the decision of the Council of Ambassadors, see: J. Kumaniecki, *Uznanie wschodniej granicy Polski przez Radę Ambasadorów*, (Recognition of Poland's Eastern Frontier by the Council of Ambassadors) „Kwartalnik Historyczny” („Historical Quarterly”), Vol. LXXXVI, 1969, No 1, pp. 73–92.

signed. The West-Ukrainian People's Republic stopped being an international matter just on 15 March 1923. After this fact the West-Ukrainian People's Republic's government and its representatives in Europe and America stopped their activity.<sup>33</sup>

In the years 1918–1923 and strictly speaking during the armed and diplomatic Polish-Ukrainian conflicts (1 November, 1918– 14/15 March 1923) there grew enduring enmity among the Galician Ukrainians to Poland and the Entente which – according to the Ukrainian population – supported the process of liquidation of the West-Ukrainian People's Republic. The tradition of their own statehood and fights carried out by the Ukrainian national army influenced later the development of the political activity of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. It was also due to the political system of Poland as well as to the level of political awareness of the Ukrainian population inhabiting the territory belonging to Poland, awareness acquired among others during the events under discussion. Such territories as Subcarpathia, Bucovina or Bessarabia were only an object not subject of international contests at the time when the Ukrainian People's Republic and the West-Ukrainian People's Republic existed. So was the Dnieper Ukraine where any activity connected with the traditions of the Ukrainian People's Republic was severely suppressed. Later those regions also remained a territory in which the national spirit and political life of the Ukrainian population were weak.<sup>34</sup>

In fact, in the years 1918–1923 the future of the Ukrainian population was decided on the battlefield, although, formally the victorious Western Powers were settling this matter. It should be stressed that during the Peace Conference the Ukrainian problem had not been treated as a minority problem as it was the case later. On the contrary, until 1923 the Dnieper Ukrainians and the Galician Ukrainians acted as representatives of their own separate states. Especially the latter, to whom more attention was paid and whose situation evolved towards turning them into a minority but a majority in their own national territory and demanded that their state's sovereignty should be legally recognized.

For the Polish government the problem of the Ukrainian minority inhabiting the south-eastern region of the Polish Republic was not a typical minority question falling within the domain of the domestic policy, either. The first attempt at formulating a coherent policy as far as the national minorities in Poland were concerned was made by General Sikorski's government but because of a short period of its activity (16 December 1922–26 May 1923)<sup>35</sup> no significant result was achieved. The next cabinet

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<sup>33</sup> T. Dąbkowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–188. See also: M. Papierzyńska-Turek, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

<sup>34</sup> Cf.: R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska ...*, p. 77.

<sup>35</sup> I. Ihnatowicz, *Vademecum do badań nad historią XIX i XX wieku (Vade-mecum for Research in the History of the 19th and 20th centuries)*, Vol. II, Warszawa 1971, p. 102.

– created by Wincenty Witos – also did little to solve this problem. Thus, the internal aspect of the problems connected with the existence of the numerous Ukrainian minority in Poland was almost untouched until it became the subject of works of Władysław Grabski's government which, however, exceeds the chronological limits of this article.<sup>36</sup>

As the eastern frontiers of Poland were not defined until 1921 and until 1923 they were not internationally recognized, the Ukrainian question in Poland had the character of a problem connected with the state's foreign policy at that time.

The neighbouring states which were themselves involved in disputes with Poland tried to take advantage in the international forum of the fact that there existed a Ukrainian minority within the Polish borders and that there was a Polish-Ukrainian conflict. This practice, started in the period under discussion, was later followed by Germany, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Soviet Russia and then the USSR.

The final result of the Ukrainian struggles during „the national revolution” in the years 1917–1923 was that the Ukrainians found themselves among the dissatisfied nations that were hostile to the order established by the Treaty of Versailles which together with the low level of the political culture of the wide circles of the Ukrainian population created an atmosphere stimulating development of extreme national movements interested in a new armed conflict at which the revisionist states were aiming. Such a conflict would make deep political changes in Europe possible. It should be said in the light of these facts that the events of the years 1919–1923 influenced the future Polish-Ukrainian relations decisively and determined the Ukrainian minority's attitude towards the Polish State for the whole period of the existence of the Second Polish Republic and during the next world-wide war turmoil.

*Translated by Dobromiła Szczygielska*

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<sup>36</sup> A. Chojnowski, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

## AZ UKRÁN NEMZETI KISEBBSÉG PROBLÉMÁI LENGYELORSZÁGBAN AZ 1919–1923-AS ÉVEKBEN

Az első világháború viharából kiemelkedő új közép-európai államok egyik legfőbb problémája a nemzeti kisebbségek kérdése volt. Az ukránok a legnagyobb létszámú kisebbséget alkották nem csak a Lengyel Köztársaságban, de egész Európában. Az ukránokat is akarattal ellenére csatolták Lengyelországhoz. A hagyományosan rossz lengyel-ukrán kapcsolatok történetéhez hozzátartozik Kelet-Galícia problémája, ahol az ukránok többségben voltak, a lengyelek pedig kisebbségben. Ugyanakkor a lengyel kisebbség kulturális és gazdasági téren egyaránt uralkodó pozíciókat vívott ki magának. A Habsburg Monarchiában a kelet-galíciaiak megszokták a birodalom alkotmányos rendszerét, így ez a terület vált az ukrán nemzeti öntudat, a politikai kultúra, egyszóval a nemzeti mozgalom központjává.

A nemzetközi politika problémájává az ukrán kérdés az 1918-as breszti békével vált. Amikor 1918 őszén létrejött a Nyugat-Ukrajnai Népköztársaság, ez az állam háborúba keveredett Lengyelországgal. Az ukrán lakosság, amely azokon a területeken élt, amelyek később Lengyelországhoz kerültek, inkább tárgya, mintsem aktív résztvevője volt a lengyel-ukrán konfliktusnak. A Nyugat-Ukrajnai Népköztársaság és a Ukrán Népköztársaság vezetői hiába reménykedtek, egyik köztársaságot sem ismerték el az antant hatalmak. Az Ukrán Népköztársaságot a németek bábaskodása, a Nyugat-Ukrajnai Népköztársaságot pedig a bolsevikokhoz fűződő kapcsolatok tüntették fel rossz színben. A lengyel diplomácia az ukránokat mint a németek bolsevik szövetségeseit tüntette föl Párizsban.

Amikor az Ukrán Népköztársaság hadereje vereséget szenvedett és a Vörös Hadsereg egységei a lengyel határok felé törtek, a nagyhatalmak úgy vélték, hogy az ukránok nem alkotnak elegendő antibolsevista erőt. A szovjet invázió azzal fenyegetett, hogy Kelet-Galícián keresztül kapcsolat létesül a Magyar Tanácsköztársasággal – legalábbis ekkoriban Párizsban sokan tartottak ettől a lehetőségtől. 1919. június 25-én Lengyelország engedélyt kapott Kelet-Galícia megszállására. Csak Gyenyikin időleges katonai sikerei tudták Lengyelország tárgyalási pozícióját meggyengíteni. A békekonferencia nem ismerte el Kelet-Galíciát lengyelország részének. 1919. december 8-án hivatalosan is kihirdették: a területet a Népszövetség mandátumának nyilvánították és Lengyelország ellenőrzése alá helyezték, 25 évre. Ennek lejárta után a Népszövetség Tanácsát bízták meg, hogy döntsön a terület hovatartozásáról. Amikor azonban Gyenyikin offenzívája összeomlott, a már kihirdetett határozat végrehajtását felfüggesztették. A nagyhatalmak belátták, hogy egyetlen lengyel kormány sem lenne hajlandó az egyszer már megszállt területeket kiűríteni. A lengyel-szovjet háború idején Lengyelország összefogott az Ukrán Népköztársasággal és az 1922-ben aláírt Rigai béke véglegesen döntött a területek felosztásáról. Az emigráns ukrán politikusok a nemzetközi fórumokon megpróbálták érvényesíteni a Nyugat-Ukrán – illetve az Ukrán – Népköztársaság jogait, sikertelenül. Amikor pedig a lengyelországi választások bojkottálására szólították föl az ukránokat, csak azt érték el, hogy a szembesítésben csak Varsóhoz hű ukrán nemzetiségi képviselők kerültek.

Az ukrán kérdés mint nemzeti kisebbségi probléma az évek során több konkrét esetben is fölmerült – így például a Lvovi Ukrán Egyetem alapítása, az ukrán nyelvű oktatás problématikája, az ortodox egyház ukrainaizálása, vagy a lengyel katonai kolonizáció ügyében. Összehasonlítva más területekkel – Bukovina, Besszarábia, Kárpát-Ukrajna, amelyek a nemzetközi vetélkedésnek pusztán tárgyai, de nem aktív résztvevői voltak – a két ukrán Népköztársaság valóban létezett. Végül is sorsuk a csatamezőkön dőlt el. Bonyolította a helyzetet, hogy Lengyelország szomszédai is igyekeztek az ukrán kérdést a maguk javára is kihasználni – így Németország, Csehszlovákia, Litvánia és Szovjet-Oroszország. A végeredmény egy a II. Lengyel Köztársasággal szemben ellenséges ukrán nemzeti kisebbség létrejötte volt.